American statesman Henry Kissinger was considered by some to be a master of diplomacy and statesmanship, but to many, he was a hardline politician who used the threat of American power to get his point across.
They had enmity with India in the 1971 war. When a secret White House tape was released in 2005, he was heard using the wrong words for India and then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Later he also apologized for it.
In the war of 1971, US President Richard Nixon and his security advisor Henry Kissinger appeared to stand completely with Pakistan.
When the Pakistani army began to crush the Bangladesh independence movement with military force, the first reaction of the US State Department was to condemn the atrocities of the Pakistani army.
Christopher Van Hollen, then-Assistant Secretary of State for East and South Asian Affairs, wrote in an article entitled ‘The Tilt Policy Revisited’ in the April 1980 issue of ‘Asian Survey’ magazine Foreign Affairs, Defense and the CIA At a meeting of officials, including some of Henry Kissinger’s own allies, they came to the conclusion that it would be in America’s interest to approach India on the pretext of brutality by the Pakistani army.
But Kissinger did not agree with this idea. Instead of seeing the tension between Pakistan and India from a local perspective, they began to see it from the perspective of the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Walter Isaacson wrote in his biography of Henry Kissinger that Kissinger at first ‘set aside morality in the context of India and Pakistan and preferred realism. Second, he viewed the conflict entirely within the context of Soviet-American competition. Kissinger’s policy of supporting Pakistan was also encouraged by US President Richard Nixon’s anti-India stance against Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Nixon and Kissinger used nasty words for Indira
This bitterness grew to such an extent that when Indira Gandhi visited America in November 1971, Richard Nixon made her wait for 45 minutes outside his office.
Catherine Frank writes in her biography of Indira Gandhi: ‘Indira Gandhi took this insult with great patience. In the meeting that followed, he did not even mention Pakistan and asked Nixon tough questions about American foreign policy. Indira talked to Nixon the way a professor talks to his academically weak student to boost morale.’
Nixon somehow controlled his anger with unemotional politeness. After the meeting, Kissinger praised his president and used unparliamentary language for Indira Gandhi.
Gary Bass in his book ‘The Blood Telegram India’s Secret War in East Pakistan’ writes: ‘Nixon praised himself and told Kissinger: ‘We gave this ‘woman’ some leeway in minor matters. But we have not retreated even an inch on the real issue.’
At this Kissinger smiled at them and said, ‘You don’t see how we have them surrounded. Mr. President, although he is a There are, but they can’t go out and say that America bit them. You did well not to be too harsh with them, otherwise they would have returned crying.’
Differences between Kissinger and the US State Department over India and Pakistan
After returning from his secret visit to China, Henry Kissinger presented an analysis of the trip to US President Richard Nixon and his advisers.
Seemer Harsh in his book ‘The Price of Power’ writes: ‘Kissinger had said that if India attacked Pakistan, China would come to Pakistan’s aid. If this happens, the Soviet Union will enter the fray on India’s side. America should stand behind Pakistan so that neither India can think of attacking Pakistan nor the Soviet Union gets a chance to interfere in this matter.’
The US State Department disagreed with Kissinger’s assessment. He believed that if there is a war between India and Pakistan, the United States should support India so that China does not get a chance to intervene.
When this view was put before the senior review group, Kissinger was furious. He said that the President has always said that we should support Pakistan. But I am being offered exactly the opposite. Sometimes I feel like I’m sitting in a madhouse.’
Kissinger took a more active role than Nixon
In August, Kissinger’s anger increased when India signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union.
But the Americans could not have guessed that this agreement was in some way India’s response to Kissinger’s secret visit to China. Kissinger’s biographer Walter Isaacson writes: ‘By establishing relations with Pakistan’s friend China, the US pushed India closer to the Soviet Union. The result was that when Indira Gandhi came to America, indifference was shown on both sides.’
Kissinger later recounted the meeting in his book The White House Years: “It was Nixon’s worst and most ill-fated meeting with any foreign leader.”
Indira Gandhi was surprised that Henry Kissinger was playing a more active role in the conversation than Richard Nixon.
Nixon would talk for a few minutes and then turn to Kissinger and ask, ‘Is that all right, Henry?’ Then Kissinger would begin his speech.
Then Nixon would say a few words and ask Kissinger, ‘Are you going to say something about that?’ “I would have been better off talking to Kissinger instead of Nixon,” Indira later said.
Persuaded the US State Department to lean towards Pakistan
When Indian troops crossed the border into East Pakistan in support of Bengali separatists on November 22, 1971, Kissinger was one of the few people in the world who believed that the event would lead to war between India and Pakistan. .
While the US Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not paying much attention to this development. Even Pakistani President Yahya Khan was saying that he still hoped that war could be avoided.
At a meeting of the US Crisis Committee on December 3, Kissinger demanded from the State Department that Nixon’s tilt towards Pakistan be accepted.
Kissinger said: ‘Every half an hour I have to listen to the President scolding me about why we are not taking a tougher attitude against India. I wonder why we are not following their wishes.’
Walter Isaacson writes: ‘Kissinger was not only instructing Nixon, but urging him to take a tougher stance against India.’
Anhun told Nixon on 5 December: ‘If Pakistan loses, we will lose our prestige in the eyes of the Soviet Union. Even the Chinese won’t like it. But if India wins, separatist movements will start elsewhere and the Soviet Union will also be encouraged to intervene elsewhere.
In the second meeting, he became more blunt, telling Nixon: ‘We would in no way want our friend and China to lose a fight to a friend of Russia.’
India declared a ceasefire due to American and Soviet pressure
On December 16, 1971, when India offered a ceasefire to Pakistan, Pakistan immediately accepted it.
Indira Gandhi declared a ceasefire without occupying a large area of Kashmir.
But Kissinger said: ‘I believe that India took this decision under Soviet pressure. Soviet decisions also came under American pressure, including the US sending its Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal and canceling a proposed Soviet visit by the US president.
But despite openly supporting Pakistan in the 1971 war, the rulers of Pakistan maintained a distance from Henry Kissinger. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto continued to hold Henry Kissinger responsible for it until his ouster and execution.
His daughter Benazir Bhutto wrote in her autobiography ‘Daughter of the East’: ‘My father held Kissinger personally responsible for his downfall. When Benazir Bhutto became Prime Minister of Pakistan, she sided with America but maintained her father’s hostility to Henry Kissinger.
A secret visit to China
The greatest moment of Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic career came when he fooled the world and reached China during his visit to Pakistan.
On July 10, 1971, a short three-line story appeared in the inside pages of the New York Times that, ‘To escape the hot and humid winds of Rawalpindi, Nixon’s national security adviser Henry Kissinger spent an entire day in the cold mountains of Nathiagali in northern Pakistan.
There are reports that Kissinger’s health is slightly unwell. The fact is that Kissinger never went to Nithyagli and a fictitious motorcade of Kissinger’s cars with sirens on and flying American flags proceeded to Nithyagli but Kissinger was not in it. Instead of him, his ‘double’ was riding in his car.
Henry Kissinger writes in his autobiography: ‘My plan was to get sick to my stomach as soon as I got to Pakistan. The embassy doctor will give me some medicine. I would still be unwell and the President of Pakistan, Yahya Khan, would advise me to rest for a day or two at his guest house in Nithyagli, and in the meantime I would leave for Beijing for secret talks with China. But God decided to punish me for this deception and when I completed my trip to Delhi, I actually started having stomach pain and had to bear this pain without telling anyone and without any medical help.
The Pakistani foreign secretary took Kissinger to the airport in his personal car
When Kissinger awoke at 3:30 a.m. on the morning of July 9, 1971, he had a quick breakfast.
Earlier, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Sultan Muhammad Khan reached Kissinger’s guest house in his personal car to bid him farewell.
Sultan Khan writes in his autobiography ‘Memoirs and Reflections’: ‘I did not use the official vehicle because calling the driver so early in the morning would have attracted attention. My son Riyaz used that car at night. I looked for the key but couldn’t find it then I went to him.
‘When I woke him up, the first question he asked was, ‘Is mummy okay?’ Are you going to the doctor so early? To appease him I replied, We are going to Nithyagli. Closing his eyes he muttered, Nithyagli at three in the morning? Your race is beyond my understanding.’
At exactly four o’clock, Pakistani army vehicles took Kissinger to Islamabad’s Chaklata Airport. Sultan Khan was also with him.
On the advice of Farland, the US ambassador to Pakistan, Kissinger put on a hat and sunglasses at four in the morning so that no one would recognize him at the Islamabad airport.
The plane was being flown by Yahya Khan’s personal pilot. Kissinger’s plane was parked openly at Chaklata Airport to give the impression to journalists who saw it that Kissinger was still in Pakistan.
Cho En Lai and Kissinger meeting
When Kissinger’s plane landed at Beijing’s military airport at 12:15 p.m., he was greeted by Marshal Yeh Qianying, one of the most senior members of the Politburo.
At precisely 4.30 PM, Chinese Prime Minister Chou Enlai arrived at the guest house to meet Kissinger. His thin face was dripping with confidence. He was wearing a beautifully stitched Mao tank.
Kissinger writes: ‘He charmed us with his charming smile. I also got the impression that he understood English very well, even though he was speaking in Chinese. I reached the guest house door and extended my hand to welcome him. He and I both remembered how, 27 years earlier, US Secretary of State Allen Foster Dulles had refused to accept his extended hand.’
‘In a short time I discovered that Cho En Lai was second to none in his philosophy, historical analysis and humorous eloquence. His knowledge of American events and of me was amazing. The meeting between Kissinger and Chu En Lai lasted for several hours.
Kissinger forgot his shirt in Islamabad
During the entire conversation, only a small piece of paper was kept in front of Chu Enlai on which he wrote a few words in telegraphic language.
Kissinger later commented: ‘Our conversation was like two professors of political philosophy talking to each other. Kissinger instructed his aide Dave Halperin to keep two clean shirts separate during the long trip, specifically for his visit to China.
But when he left Kissinger and was going to Nithyagli, he came to know that Kissinger had left those shirts in Islamabad. Kissinger learned this on the plane. When he tried to change his shirt before landing in Beijing, it was found that it was not in the suitcase.’
Kissinger writes: ‘I had to borrow a shirt from John Holdridge. His height was six feet two inches. If you look carefully at the photos taken during this period, you will notice that my neck is not visible in them, because John’s neck was at least an inch shorter than mine.’
Kissinger called Indian Ambassador Lakshmi Kant Jha
Kissinger returned to Islamabad on July 11, preparing for Nixon’s visit to China. Before the airport, they were taken to Nithyagli to make it appear that they were returning from Nithyagli.
At 6 p.m., Kissinger boarded his plane to return to America. Nixon was eagerly waiting for him in America. They knew the trip was a success because Kissinger had sent them the predetermined code ‘Eureka’ as soon as they boarded the plane.
On the day the US was to announce that Henry Kissinger had secretly visited China, India’s ambassador to the US, Lakshmi Kant Jha, received a phone call. At that time, he was outside his house. His Indian security guard, who did not speak English, said, ‘There was a call from Kishan Chandraji for Sahib Bahadur.’
In his biography of Indira Gandhi, Pipal Jaikar writes: ‘Jha did not understand who this Kishan Chandra was? He asked his secretary to call the number he had left. It turned out that the phone belonged to Kissinger, who was mistaken for Kishan Chandra by his guard. Kissinger was in Los Angeles at the time.’
He asked the Indian ambassador that ‘where will you be tonight at half past eight? Jha said he would be at dinner. Kissinger took her number and said he would call her at exactly 8:30. He did not tell Mr. Jha what the call would be about. At 8.30, when Kissinger’s phone rang, Jha picked up the phone himself.
Kissinger said: “In half an hour, President Nixon is going to announce that I secretly went to China while visiting India and Pakistan.” President Nixon wants him to convey a message to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. You write it down. The message said that America is going to establish political relations with China. If India opposes it, it will be considered an unfriendly move. President Nixon believed that India would oppose him.
Indira Gandhi did not comment on this step of America. He quietly sent a message to Moscow. Exactly one month after this incident, on 9 August 1971, India signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union.