Brigadier Hardev Singh Kaler had his sights set on Dhaka. Educated from Gordon College, Rawalpindi, Brigadier Culler was commanding the 95 Mountain Brigade of the Indian Army in 1971.
It was at this time that the Indian Army had completed preparations for an invasion of East Pakistan, where a civil war had erupted after the Awami League was kept out of power despite a clear victory in the elections.
Brigadier Hardev Singh was tasked with attacking East Pakistan from Assam in the north and intended to reach Dhaka first.
However, the first obstacle in the way of his plan was a small military outpost on the northern border of East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh after the war.
Kamalpur was no more than a dot on the map. Along with numerical and air superiority, Brigadier Hardev Singh had a heavy artillery presence. Apart from this, defectors from the East Pakistan Army, trained and armed by India, i.e. two to three battalions of the Mukti Bahini, were also available.
Capturing the small border outpost of Kamalpur was apparently a matter of hours, but the outpost, where a young Pakistani army officer, Captain Ahsan Malik, went to strengthen the defensive position with only 70 soldiers and as many semi-trained Rangers and volunteers. It was going to be a turning point for Brigadier Hardev where Captain Ahsan Malik had only three mortars to take on an entire brigade and the Indian Air Force.
Had Brigadier Hardev Singh captured Kamalpur, access to Dacca would have been easier for him. This encounter between Captain Ahsan Malik and Brigadier Hardev Singh is also of military significance as it began several weeks before the regular battle, by the end of which the courageous defense of the young Pakistani army officer had even cost the Indian army chief. forced to confess their bravery.
India’s military strategy
The Indian Army had already launched incursions within the borders of East Pakistan and attacks by the Mukti Bahini before the formal start of the war, with the aim of facilitating the pre-war advance.
Captain Ahsan Malik, who had received a commission in the army four years ago, was posted at this outpost located only 1,000 yards from the Indian border. gave Attacks on the post in June and July had already taken place before their deployment, but on 22 October 1971, Indian troops and the Mukti Bahini jointly attacked the post.
In his book ‘Witnesses to Surrender’, Siddique Salik wrote that nine Indian attackers including an officer were killed in this attack. The next attack was carried out on 14 November in which Indian soldiers were also involved.
Ahsan Malik wrote in the Pakistan Army magazine Hilal that on November 15, when some of his soldiers went out for patrolling, they were fired upon. Ahsan Malik realizes that his outpost has been surrounded by the Indian Army after the initial attempt to capture the outpost failed.
Defense of Kamalpur
Brigadier Hardev was forced to change tactics after the initial failure. They completely besieged the post and started heavy artillery bombardment. Major General Sukhwant Singh has written in his book ‘India’s Wars Since Independence’ that Brigadier Hardev with the help of two battalions completely surrounded the outpost.
Siddiq Salik writes in his book that “Brigadier Killer’s aim was to put psychological pressure on the Pakistani soldiers instead of causing more casualties in the attack on the post and to make them surrender by eliminating the possibility of any kind of reinforcement reaching them.” To be forced.’
However, Ahsan Malik dug trenches in his outpost and reinforced them with concrete. The trenches were interconnected to enable daylight movement. Another aspect of his defense strategy he learned from the Vietnam War. Under this strategy, a fence was built around the post with the help of pointed bamboos so that no attacker could easily gain access to the post. In addition, grenades, mines and anti-tank materials were installed around the checkpoint.
Despite the heavy bombardment, due to this defensive strategy, Captain Ahsan Malik and his men did not suffer from ‘psychological pressure’, so on November 21, the Indian Army launched a full-scale attack. This time the Indian army had to suffer heavy casualties. After some time, another attack also failed in the same way.
According to Ahsan Malik, the next morning he counted 28 dead bodies around the post, one of which was the captain. According to Ahsan Malik, these bodies were buried at night for fear of spreading disease.
Ahsan Malik had thus far thwarted his attempts to capture his post, but he was completely surrounded.
His battalion, the commanding officer of 31 Baloch, Lt. Col. Sultan, was present at the battalion headquarters a few miles away, who tried to break the siege of the Indian army and send reinforcements to Captain Ahsan Malik, but these efforts were unsuccessful.
In the context of efforts to bring reinforcements to Kamalpur, Brigadier Hardev once again tried to capture the post on the night of 27 November, but this time also failed.
General Niazi and American journalist
Meanwhile, the Chief of Army Staff in East Pakistan, Lt. Gen. Amir Abdullah Niazi, visited the 31 Baloch Company headquarters at Bakshiganj, a few miles south of Kamalpur. An American journalist Dan Sutherland was also with him.
According to Captain Ahsan Malik, he informed General Niazi over the wireless that he was now running low on ammunition. In response, General Niazi promised to send reinforcements to them.
When the American journalist was told that the regular Indian army was attacking Kamalpur and that its soldiers had been killed, he demanded to see the bodies of the dead soldiers. He was informed that to see these bodies, he would have to go to the Kamalpur post seven miles north, which is surrounded by the Indian army.
Dean Sutherland insisted that he wanted to go to the post. After the departure of General Niazi that night, Company Commander Major Ayub went out to deliver rations and arms to Captain Ahsan Malik, Sutherland also accompanied him.
These people were at some distance from Kamalpur when the Indian Army and Mukti Bahini started firing on them. In such a situation, Bhagdar Machi and Major Ayub managed to reach the post, but Sutherland was nowhere to be found. According to Captain Ahsan Malik, an attempt was made to find Sutherland around the post, but this attempt was not successful.
The next day it was learned that Sutherland had actually hid in the fields to save his life at the time of the firing and had returned to Bakshiganj taking advantage of the darkness of the night.
Lack of arms and food
Brigadier Hardev Singh’s patience was running out. On the other hand, the Indian High Command was also questioning why it was taking so long to capture a small outpost when they had a clear numerical advantage.
Another attack was made on Kamalpur around November 30. This time Captain Ahsan Malik let the Indian soldiers come closer. As soon as the Indian soldiers approached the post, they suddenly opened fire on them. After the attack was repulsed, around 20 bodies were counted.
According to Major General Sukhwant Singh, “During the attack on the outpost, when a counter-mortar shell fell near the Indian battalion commander and the rags of four soldiers flew, he was misled and the attackers had to retreat, after which the commanding officer was replaced.’
Major General Sukhwant Singh writes that ‘due to constant attacks and casualties, the morale of the Indian troops was low and the high command began to doubt Brigadier Hardev’s ability.’
Siddique Salik wrote in his book that after two weeks of fighting, the real problem was that there was a shortage of ammunition and food because all efforts to get supplies to Ahsan Malik had failed.
In such a situation, it was necessary for Ahsan Malik to save pills and food and therefore he took some measures to ensure that the available supplies would last as long as possible. According to Siddique Salik, the injured Fouhis and volunteers could not be provided with the necessary medical treatment because “there was only one nursing assistant at the checkpoint who could only bandage and give medicine for pain.”
According to Siddique Salik’s book, now at Ahsan Malik’s post, ‘each soldier had 75 bullets per rifle, 200 rounds of light machine gun and 22 mortar shells left.’